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Inclusive Pedagogy: Beyond Simple
Content
SHEILA LINTOTT

AND

LISSA SKITOLSKY

I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic apparatus which
permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible
those that will be acceptable within, I won’t say a scientific theory, but a field
of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false. The episteme is
the “apparatus” which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the
false, but of what may from what may not be characterized as scientific.
—Interview with Michel Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh”

HOW WE TEACH WHAT WE TEACH
Philosophers have made notable progress in making philosophy more inclusive and
welcoming. Feminist philosophers and philosophers of race in particular have helped
increase the number and visibility of women and people of color through efforts such
as the Mentoring Project for Pre-Tenure Women Faculty in Philosophy (Antony and
Cudd 2015), Minorities and Philosophy (MAP 2015), the Gendered Conference
Campaign (Feminist Philosophers 2009), and the UPDirectory (UPDirectory 2015).
Philosophers have also come to appreciate that our pedagogies need to be and can be
inclusive. Efforts such as a public Google doc containing a database of philosophical
works by women suitable for undergraduate courses (Anonymous 2015), the APA
Diversity and Inclusiveness Syllabus Collection (APA 2015), and conference panels
and workshops1 on diversifying philosophical readings in various courses are excellent
contributions in this regard. The message that philosophers should work to make
their classes more diverse by including readings written by members of groups traditionally underrepresented in philosophy (basically, anyone other than white, middleupper-class, heterosexual, able-bodied males) and by taking as philosophically serious
issues concerning diversity has been received and acted upon by many of us. So, it is
now far less likely, although unfortunately still quite likely, to find an introduction to
philosophy syllabus assigning only texts written by the great dead white males. We
are also seeing more and more courses on feminist philosophy and philosophy of race
being taught today than even a decade ago and, dare we say, more respect being paid
to these courses and relevant research by mainstream philosophers than ever before.
Hypatia vol. 31, no. 2 (Spring 2016) © by Hypatia, Inc.
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Beyond considerations of content, however, we find form. We have learned from
feminist philosophy and critical theory that neutrality is a myth; this applies also to
the seemingly neutral ways we structure our courses, design our assignments, and
assess student achievement and mastery of material. It isn’t enough to diversify the
topics and authors in our classes, to simply, in other words, add women or add color,
and stir. For philosophy to live up to its potential as a force for social justice and progress, we must reconsider how we teach what we teach. Just as many of us have recognized that we must learn new content in order to teach more socially responsible
versions of our courses, we should also be willing to learn new methods of teaching—
and, indeed, of learning.
At the first Diversity in Philosophy Conference in 2013, in a presentation titled
“Challenging the Canon,” Eugene Marshall asks us to imagine applying a version of
the Bechdel Test to our syllabuses: “A philosophy syllabus passes the test just when
(1) it contains two or more texts by women authors (2) who are, preferably, in dialogue with each other, (3) but, at least, doing something other than merely responding to the ideas of a man” (Marshall 2013).2 We would like to propose an additional
guideline for philosophy courses inspired by Maria Lugones’s powerful essay, “Playfulness, ‘World’-Traveling, and Loving Perception.” Lugones encourages playfulness in
the service of learning and learning to love as follows:
Playfulness is, in part, an openness to being a fool, which is a combination
of not worrying about competence, not being self-important, not taking
norms as sacred and finding ambiguity and double edges a source of wisdom and delight.
She continues,
So, positively, the playful attitude involves openness to surprise, openness
to being a fool, openness to self-construction or reconstruction and to
construction or reconstruction of the “worlds” we inhabit playfully. Negatively, playfulness is characterized by uncertainty, lack of self-importance,
absence of rules or a not taking rules as sacred, a not worrying about competence and a lack of abandonment to a particular construction of oneself,
others and one’s relation to them. (Lugones 1987, 17)
Lugones counsels that such playfulness is safe only in certain worlds, worlds not constructed by and for arrogant perceivers. To make philosophy more inclusive and welcoming, professors can aim to create an atmosphere—a world—in which a kind of
decentering playfulness thrives, by designing nontraditional assignments, studying
nontraditional philosophical texts, and being willing to engage with the students on
their own terms, even when those terms are unfamiliar and perhaps uncomfortable
for the professor. As professors at two different universities, we have each attempted
to accomplish this in different ways and have found that the result can be a philosophy classroom characterized by an aggregate attitude of openness, willingness to
explore new ideas and possibilities, lack of undue deference to inherited academic
norms, and relish for a broad range of modes of expression and communication. One
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cannot predict precisely what will happen in such a classroom, but taking such risks
is an essential step toward a more thorough diversification of our field. Indeed, the
willingness to take risks is essential in the effort to overturn the status quo, including
the status quo of philosophy, which, as we all know, is particularly resistant to
change. Our judgments and institutions are reinforced by academic discourses that
are structurally biased and privilege certain “appropriate” forms of discourse and correlating forms of intellectual excellence. This discourse helps compose what Foucault
referred to as the episteme: “In any given culture and at any given moment, there is
always only one episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge,
whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice” (Foucault 1970,
168). The reigning discourse was also implicated by Marx and referred to as the superstructure: “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on
the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. . .. With the
change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less
transformed” (Marx 1977, 4–5).
Despite efforts to diversify the content of philosophy classes by ensuring that philosophy written by a diverse and representative selection of philosophers is studied,
students still may be alienated when required to participate in a discourse that is not
their own. In what follows, we explain what we mean by decentering playfulness and
why it is needed in the classroom.

CRACKING

THE

EPISTEME

THROUGH

PERFORMANCE: DECENTERING PLAYFULNESS

Ludwig Wittgenstein and Michel Foucault expose how language does not merely represent the world, but instead structures the multitude of our worlds and does so in
part by determining what actions and statements make “sense” and therefore deserve
recognition and respect. Those that aren’t deemed sensible are met with censure and
blame. As Wittgenstein first pointed out in Philosophical Investigations, language games
comprise “the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven”
(Wittgenstein 1962, ¶7), including gestures, habits, and worldviews as “the speaking of
language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (¶23). We are misled by our belief
that some forms of expression are essentially more appropriate than others, into
believing that the reigning episteme is morally and epistemically neutral in the games
academics play.
Language and the language games we play coerce us into predictable, regulated
relations with others, constricting the range of possibilities we can truly consider. We
are always already participating in relations of power sustained and justified by the
reigning episteme. This episteme informs the language games that we learn and create
in order to participate in the public sphere. In the academic context, oppressive language games are powerful despite commitments to social justice and efforts to expose
and undermine oppression. Even while we aim to open up the structure of discourse
by focusing on relevant progressive content and issues, insofar as we unquestioningly
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accept the reigning episteme, we constrict the field of possible enunciations at any
one time.
Indeed, especially in the academic domain, where only some forms of expression
count as fully embodying the dignity we associate with scholarly life, where only
some forms of expression are deemed meaningful, the expectations we set for and the
expressions we accept from our students are far from neutral. Within the academy,
under the pretense of openness, dialogue, and free inquiry, we constrict our use of
language by respecting boundaries between academic and nonacademic inquiry as
given, natural, and defensible. As Judith Butler explains, “language constitutes the
subject in part through foreclosure, a kind of unofficial censorship or primary restriction in speech that constitutes the possibility of agency in speech” (Butler 1997, 41).
Butler also makes clear that the racist, classist, and sexist structure of the episteme also
informs our visual and imaginative fields.3 The notion of “dignity” that delimits what
sorts of verbal enunciations are appropriate to academic endeavors is not universal.
Not recognizing the diversity of meaningful methods and modes of expression
marginalizes minority groups and silences potentially revolutionary actions, as both of
these can expose the contingent and oppressive epistemic structure that perpetuates
racist, classist, and heterosexist relations of power.
Recognizing more than one possible form of excellence encourages real social
change within and beyond the ivory tower. Decentering playfulness in our classes can
call out the implicit assumption that any one method or mode of discourse can be
the only or even the most viable route to knowledge. In other words, through incorporating and exploring alternative modes of inquiry, the hegemonic discourse is
shifted from its privileged and central locale within the field of discursive domains.
This allows students to see the academic structure of meaning as a structure. For
example, by integrating rap and spoken word as assignments in courses and focusing
on alternative forms of philosophical writing as texts such as letters from prisoners,
autobiography, blogs, and underground hip-hop, the comfortable center cannot hold.
This pedagogy ushers the privileged, including—maybe especially—the professor(s),
outside their comfort zone. In fact, nontraditional assignments and texts have
enriched our understanding of the subject matter despite—and sometimes because of
—our own and some students’ discomfort with the use of such texts and methods of
learning and assessment in academic contexts.

NECESSITY

OF

PLAYFULNESS

IN THE

ACADEMIC WORLD

Though we “perform” our socially sanctioned scripts every day, we are not conscious
of our behavior as performance; it is seen and experienced as what is “normal” and
“everyday.” When our students self-consciously perform ideas and/or participate in
modes of expression that are not “natural” or “normal” in their academic world or
social interactions, they can better recognize how certain privileged forms of expression rest on the suppression of other truths and ideas that escape them. In our experiences, students are nervous about stepping outside of their comfort zone in order to
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be assessed on skills and knowledge that are not traditionally regarded as forms of
academic excellence. However, we have also found that the wisdom gleaned from
this discomfort has furthered the pedagogical aim of our courses better than written
work alone. When we integrate marginalized discourses and alternative forms of
expression into the structure of our courses and assignments, students who usually
have the privilege of feeling “normal” can existentially experience the discomfort of
performing as the “other.” In this way, performance can better expose the episteme as
the episteme as well as reveal cracks in its totalizing facßade.
A next step in resisting and subverting structural discrimination in society as well
as in philosophy is twofold. First, it involves incorporating marginalized discourses as
texts. Second, it involves valuing varied forms of expression students might utilize in
engaging with the material and philosophical issues it confronts. Both of these efforts
have the potential to fully engage students not already at the center of the academic
enterprise. Such students are like Lugones’s world-traveler who finds herself in
another world where she does not feel at home. By presenting them with an opportunity to speak in their own voices and in which their own epistemic standpoint may
be afforded a privileged position, these students are placed at the center of an academic enterprise that may previously have seemed alien and uninviting to them. At
the center, we can now find the marginalized student.
Furthermore, expanding the sorts of expression valued beyond that of formal academic writing gives students at the center of the academic enterprise a glimpse into
what is required of the others on a regular basis if they are to succeed in college. This
is akin to Lugones’s suggestion that the arrogant perceiver must be willing to leave
her comfort zone to open herself up to sincere engagement with otherness. For example, the straight-A student who has trained for college from an early age through a
college-prep curriculum may easily construct a five-page philosophical analysis of the
main argument in Descartes’s Meditations. This student may immediately understand
the traditional assignment and be able to complete it with little effort. However, little effort is not necessarily what we want to encourage in philosophy. If asked to
complete a less traditional assignment, this student will likely find it less natural and
as a result may struggle in just the way we want students to struggle. The world that
was once their inheritance has now shifted in a way that asks them to grow and
change. How novel!
Instead of merely allowing diverse voices to enter a space that has been structured
without their consent and probably against their interests, varying the kinds of assignments required can shift the balance of comfort and expertise in a way that allows
previously marginalized voices to speak for themselves and from themselves. Philosophical intuitions and assumptions are weighed against the real-life experiences of
individuals, especially marginalized individuals, for example, prisoners and the disabled. For example, we have incorporated slam poetry and underground rap music
into traditional philosophy courses as both texts and as student work. (Interested
readers will find samples of student work in Appendices A and B at the end of this
article.) Including these sources as texts to be studied gives voice to marginalized
groups and raises salient issues for these groups. Students are also invited to produce
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similar texts for class credit, allowing them to engage with philosophy on their own
terms and in their own voices. This allows their testimony to function as text, piercing the univocal expression of “true” philosophical discourse that reinforces the
heterosexist, racist, and classist structure of society. In short, theoretically and practically, we problematize the distinction between philosophical and nonphilosophical
texts and question the assumption that there is basically one kind of worthwhile
philosophical writing. After all, the goal is not just to open philosophy to a more
diverse set of practitioners but to open philosophy to a more diverse set of practices,
making philosophy not only better for marginalized persons, but also just simply
better.

CHALLENGES
The pedagogical approach we have described here is not a panacea to diversifying
philosophy. It must be incorporated responsibly and with due diligence. In closing,
we would like to discuss two pressing challenges to creating a classroom where decentering playfulness is likely to thrive. These are the risks of cultural appropriation, and
the duty to demystify traditional academic discourse.
First, the risk of cultural appropriation is real, especially with regard to hip-hop
and rap. Cultural capital affords dominant groups the freedom to coopt expressive
elements from marginalized groups, not to respectfully appreciate them, but instead to
profit from, mimic, and sometimes mock them. The activity of cultural appropriation
is distinct from sincere curiosity fueled by a desire to learn from other cultures. Learning from another culture, as in Lugones’s “world-traveling,” involves recognizing its
contributions to the pursuit of wisdom and how they developed in a specific context
and life-world.
Thus, when alternative assignments run the risk of cultural appropriation, professors must ensure that students engage with the material and assignment in appropriate ways. In our courses we frame specific course discussions around readings that
highlight the difference between appreciation and cooptation. The difference in practice is, of course, often difficult to discern. For example, there is a history of rappers
with white privilege who have significantly contributed to the form and content of
hip-hop, such as the Beastie Boys, RA the Rugged Man, and Brother Ali, to name
just a few. It is not the case that those who are racialized as “white” cannot rap, nor
that they should not rap; we have found it helpful to discuss the difference between
cooptation and participation by comparing and contrasting those rappers who “ape”
the style, for example, Vanilla Ice and Iggy Azalea, and those able to “create” rap in
their own voices and from their own perspectives, legitimately participating in the
global phenomenon currently constituted by rappers from virtually every cultural and
ethnic group.
The playfulness we advocate does not involve donning a costume or playing a
trivial game. It is playfulness in which one learns and grows by appreciating the
diversity of discursive and nondiscursive forms of creative excellence and knowledge.
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We cannot allow the fear of cultural tourism to preclude our education about diverse
forms of cultural expression, but instead we need to discuss the nature of and problems with cultural appropriation in the midst of diversifying our philosophical practices. A primary aim of diversifying the practice and the content of philosophy is to
disrupt the hegemonic imposition of a single form of intelligible expression as the
only legitimate form of philosophical inquiry. If we fail to diversify philosophical
modes of inquiry, then we simply reinforce the epistemic structures that marginalize
alternative forms of expression capable of upsetting the status quo. Shying away from
diversifying assignments out of fear of offending merely allows the normalization of
cultural appropriation to go unquestioned.
Second, philosophy professors should aim to increase their students’ philosophical
literacy, and this cannot be accomplished via decentered playfulness alone. In other
words, as one colleague put it, an important part of the philosophy professor’s job is
“to introduce students to the norms of traditional academic discourse, because [we]
can’t really assume that they already know that ‘language game’.”4 The risk is that in
introducing alternative forms of philosophical investigation, we fail to remedy the
alienation most students confront when introduced to philosophy. If we don’t lessen
their alienation through teaching them greater proficiency in analytic thought and
philosophical writing, are we doing them a disservice?
Undoubtedly, a significant part of our job as philosophy professors is to introduce
students to the norms of traditional academic discourse. Hence, the inclusion of
assignments that speak to other perspectives, values, and skills is not recommended
to the exclusion of more traditional engagements and assignments. Yet we do our students—and ourselves—a grave injustice if we proceed as if these norms are morally
neutral, as if they have not served to perpetuate oppressive perspectives, values, and
skills. Pointing out the oppressive frameworks can only go so far because, as Butler
notes, “as we think about worlds that might one day become thinkable, sayable, legible, the opening of the foreclosed and the saying of the sayable become part of the
very ‘offense’ that must be committed in order to expand the domain of linguistics”
(Butler 1997, 41). To disrupt the hegemonic imposition of those norms and imagine
better methods of inquiry requires recognizing and learning from multiple philosophical forms of communication and achievement.

NOTES
We presented an earlier version of this essay at the Hypatia/APA Conference on the Status of Women, Exploring Collaborative Contestations and Diversifying Philosophy, May
28–30, 2015, at Villanova University, and we are appreciative of all who attended our session, provided feedback, and discussed our ideas with us. We also appreciate the feedback
and suggestions offered by the two anonymous Hypatia reviewers as well as that of Hypatia’s editor, Sally Scholz. Finally and most important, we thank the Bucknell University
and Susquehanna University students who have allowed us to share their work here:
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Darriana Howard, Stephanie Salazar, and Kahlia Roberts, and all of the students who have
eagerly engaged in the alternative assignments we’ve described here.
1. Excellent panels on this topic were included, for example, in the 2013 Diversity
in Philosophy Conference at the University of Dayton (APA 2013) and are showing up
on more mainstream philosophy conference programs than ever before.
2. “I propose a version of the Bechdel Test for philosophy syllabuses. For those who
do not know, Alison Bechdel is a comic artist who proposed the following test for movies
in 1985 in her comic Dykes to Watch Out For: The test requires that a film have (1) at
least two women characters, (2) who speak to each other, (3) about something other than
a man. A shockingly low percentage of films pass this test” (Marshall 2013, conference
presentation).
3. See, for example, “Endangered/Endangering: Schematic Racism and White Paranoia” (Butler 1993). Butler asserts that the racist structure of the episteme informs the visual
and imaginative fields. In order to explain the jury’s view in the Rodney King trial, that King
was a threat to the police officers who beat him, Butler asks: “How do we account for this reversal of gesture and intention in terms of a racial schematization of the visible field? Is this a
specific transvaluation of agency proper to a racialized episteme? And does the possibility of
such a reversal call into question whether what is ‘seen’ is not always already in part a question of what a certain racist episteme produces as the visible? For if the jurors came to see in
Rodney King’s body a danger to the law, then this ‘seeing’ requires to be read as that which
was culled, cultivated, regulated—indeed, policed—in the course of the trial. This is not a
simple seeing, an act of direct perception, but the racial production of the visible, the workings of racial constraints on what it means to ‘see.’ Indeed, the trial calls to be read not only
as instruction in racist modes of seeing but as a repeated and ritualistic production of blackness. . .. This is a seeing which is a reading, that is, a contestable construal, but one which
nevertheless passes itself off as ‘seeing,’ a reading which became for that white community,
and for countless others, the same as seeing” (Butler 1993, 16).
4. Deborah Boyle, personal correspondence, September 1, 2015.
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLE

OF

STUDENT SLAM POEM

Slam poem written, performed, and analyzed in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for an intermediate-level undergraduate course in feminist philosophy at Bucknell
University:
“OUR VOICE”

BY

DARRIANA HOWARD

AND

STEPHANIE SALAZAR

“What lies between your thighs is a man’s Genesis, so how dare he spit upon
scripture”
was a line spoken by one of my favorite poets.
But of course things never play out as they should,
so he continues to participate in conversation he has no say in, dictating . . .
as if it was not one of my kind who birthed him into existence.
One of my kind who got him nurtured into adulthood.
So here’s a list of things we become before we are done becoming women.
1. Second place.
You see “ladies first” is just a myth.
The only time we come first is on the opening of a door.
But even THAT’S gotten patronized, how?
Because you get those so-called gentlemen who really just want to watch
our assets cross the door first.
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2. Objectified.
High school without the makeup, dates, and push up bras would not be
high school.
Curl your hair, keep up with the trends, and don’t forget to
suck in, turn to your good side and smile bright for the cameras.
After all, crowd approval is the most important.
Find the perfect potion for beauty, sexiness, intelligence, and of course
some morals!
3. I don’t even have the name for it,
but you know that thing we went through that involved a lesson
on how not to get raped instead of teaching men NOT to rape?
Wear knee-length skirts, don’t leave the house past sundown,
don’t take shortcuts, and always have your keys ready.
Basically, stay on the lookout for all the men you see
because more than likely they want to assault you.
And if they do it’s your fault for not having been careful enough!
Which reminds me of a story of when . . .
He stopped. Pulled up his pants, turned on the light, took another beer
and walked away. While I lay there and thought to myself,
When did I say yes?
My mind was chasing in circles as I searched for this moment and realized
it never
happened. I never said yes, and I never said give it to me.
Yet,
Still I found myself lying there.
Let’s start from the beginning. It’s October 30th and it’s homecoming night.
So I go to my room and try to find something nice.
I put on a pretty black dress,
of course because it complements my body and everyone will be in town
tonight,
but for him?
It was meant to make the process easier. So it could be less work to remove
from my hips, to my chest, over my shoulders and past my head.
Or maybe it was when I decided to do the extras,
I put on too much makeup and fixed my hair too nicely, . . .
Applied shadow and liner to my eyes, ran bright-red lipstick across the
curls of my lips and pressed my hair, just so it would fall right.
In his eyes, was this consent?
Could this not just be pride and a bit of confidence on my end?
Well no . . . God forbid I tried to get all sexied up for myself.
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As I continue to lie there, I recognize that still,
I never said yes.
So where throughout the process of getting ready for what I thought would
be a night I’d never forget did I say yes?
Because now, this is a night that I regret and want to forget.
And after all my pondering of what I did wrong,
It became very clear to me that people don’t understand the meaning of
consent.
Consent isn’t getting me to drink, so I loosen up and realize “I want it.”
Consent isn’t the lack of a verbal no,
Consent isn’t me hesitating to accept your demand to enter me.
And consent isn’t getting permission to take the next step but really taking
three.
BOOM,
he exited the room,
And I realized
I never said yes, and I never said give it to me.
Yet,
Still I found myself lying there.
End story.
We’ve grown up in a world that is home to oppressors.
I said we’ve grown up in a world that is home to oppressors.
And though we birthed them, they own us . . .
For now.
Because I stay hopeful of the fact that it is not long until
they realize that without our womb they have no dictatorship.
And call us naive, but hope seems to be all we have.
Hope gave us voting rights,
Hope gave us higher education,
Hope gave us jobs,
Hope gave us a voice, and
hope will continue to give us what we should have been born into
for simply being human beings.
After all
what lies between our thighs is a man’s Genesis, so how dare he spit upon
scripture.
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE

OF

STUDENT RAP

Rap written, performed, and analyzed in partial fulfillment of requirements for an
intermediate undergraduate-level course in philosophy of hip-hop.
“SLAVERY

IN THE

ACADEMY”

BY

KAHLIA ROBERTS

In my house, music was respected,
Ask me, I say that I’m eclectic,
Everything from Dead to electric,
‘Scept that rap by a gangsta was rejected.
Since 4th grade, been in a choir,
Voice stretching higher and higher,
And how long does that note last?
Well, that’s the mark of a choir caste.
Yet I hated rap into my teens,
Then even then, it was all about Charlie Scene,
Fake-ass angst an’ little bitta Marx,
And Danny Boy with a voice like a lark.
Then I got up in the Academy,
Wouldn’t shout Undead for the life of me,
Ashamed, thinkin’ profs only want some Mozart harmony.
But if I think rappers didn’t know the shit
That I spit,
Then I’m full of it.
They be the original Marxists and feminists,
Got my back as a po, queer, atheist,
Fuck Kohlberg if 2Pac be singin’ it!
You know it’s slav’ry we dealin’
As long as we stealin’
The knowledge rappers spit
That we find appealin’.
‘Cuz everyone can get plagiarized,
But no Ph.D., so it ain’t legitimized,
But you bet ‘cho ass, just because it ain’t cotton,
Doesn’t mean we ain’t stealin’ what oughta be boughten.
So we got slavery, up in the academy
We take what don’t belong to us,
Time gonna come soon to pay the fuck up,
Got slavery in the academy,
Think our ideas are bright,
Well they’re not,
Our minds rot,
While rappers do the work
But professors get to talk.
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And lest you think that merely,
The academy uses slaves then clearly,
Let me sing it for you dearly,
That they churn out new slaves yearly.
Wire round my throat to make me write essays,
To say the way that pays until the end of days,
Until my mind’s a haze, and the essays stay,
And the words that play make me feel hooray!
Life’s all play, be hap-pay, it’s all good today!
Cuz blinders shade my gaze,
So the establishment’s not afraid,
That someday they’ll lose their maids,
Drivers, cashiers, and all other slaves,
Cuz’ they’ll always work to keep me amazed,
At how white, male bastards paved the way,
For everyone—I mean them—to lie in the shade.
And when I flounce across that stage,
To whom do I pay homage?
Diploma in my hand,
But under what demands?
Can I help all children share this land?
Or will I just be the new iron hand,
With the wire, around the throat,
Of the child, from the choir,
To make her write essays,
That pay my pay until the end of my days,
Will I keep them amazed, that straight white men are heroes always?
Or will I break them down,
Will I make them frown,
Will I make them hear that hate abounds,
That the money wasn’t just on the ground,
It didn’t just lie around,
It was taken, not just found,
Will I make them hear this thundering sound?
What will I say, who will I be,
Who will I tell that there’s slavery in the academy,
Do you hear me?
Slavery in the academy,
It’s a slavery academy!
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